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TWO DECADES AFTER BEECH:
CONFUSION OVER THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT OPINIONS IN PUBLIC
RECORDS
THOMAS J. MCCARTHY & JOHN M. POWER*

In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,1 the Supreme Court held
that the "public records" hearsay exception, embodied in Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), included opinions and other evaluative
materials contained in government reports that set forth "factual
findings" from official investigations, "unless the sources of
lack
of
indicate
other
circumstances
or
information
This decision constituted an important
trustworthiness." 2
development in evidence law because, prior to Beech, a number of
federal courts excluded opinions in public records on the ground
that they were not "factual findings" within the meaning of Rule
3
803(8)(C) and, thus, not admissible via the hearsay exception.
The effect of Beech was to open the floodgates to the relatively
uncritical admission of a wide variety of government reports and
other documents that contain expert opinions and other evaluative
statements involving scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.
The law has always exhibited a healthy skepticism of opinion
evidence, but Beech dismissed such doubts in cases involving
opinions contained in public records on the theory that the general
* Mr. McCarthy is a 1981 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and
a former partner of Jenner & Block LLP with extensive experience in complex
civil litigation. Mr. Power is a 2008 graduate of Washington and Lee School of
Law and a litigation associate at Jenner & Block LLP.
1. 488 U.S. 153 (1988) [hereinafter Beech III].
2. Id. at 167 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C)). In describing the nature of
the content of public records that may be found admissible pursuant to Rule
to "opinions,"
the Beech Court referred interchangeably
803(8)(C),
"conclusions," and "evaluative reports." Id. at 167-68. The Court's language,
as well as its underlying rationale, suggests that the holding of Beech is
intended to encompass a broad range of extra-factual content in public
records, regardless of its specific form, as long as it otherwise satisfies the
requirements of Rule 803(8)(C). Id. at 168-69. For ease of reference, this
article will refer to the broad types of content subsumed within the holding of
Beech as "opinion" evidence.
3. Id. at 161-62.
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rules of relevance and probativeness, together with the
trustworthiness "safeguard" in Rule 803(8)(C), would screen out
bad opinions. 4 That many of the opinions contained in public
records constitute expert opinions was not a major concern at the
time because the predominant standard for admitting expert
testimony, taken from Frye v. United States,5 was focused simply
on "whether the techniques used [by the witness] were 'generally
accepted by the relevant scientific community."' 6 Government
agencies frequently set the guidelines under which scientific
inquiry is conducted, so it was not unreasonable to expect that a
government investigation conducted pursuant to those guidelines
would be both trustworthy for purposes of Rule 803(8)(C) and
consistent with the generally accepted standard under Frye.
Opinions in public records that passed the trustworthiness test for
hearsay under Rule 803(8)(C) typically were presumed to meet the
Frye threshold standard for expert testimony as well. Indeed, as
the Fourth Circuit explained in 1984, "[e]vidence that falls within
the 803(8)(C) exception ...has already met the Frye standard.
Because the evidence has been gathered and presented by a public
agency it may be presumed to reflect methodologies accepted by
7
the scientific community."
The use of "trustworthiness" as a proxy for the Frye standard
in this context made some sense as long as "general acceptance"
remained the applicable standard for admitting expert evidence.
Five years after Beech, however, the Supreme Court changed the
landscape for the admission of expert evidence in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.8 Daubert held that the Frye
standard was superseded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 9 The
Supreme Court explained that, while "general acceptance" still
may be a relevant factor under Rule 702 for assessing the
reliability of an expert's opinion, district courts should consider a
variety of additional factors modeled after the scientific method to
determine whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
admitted into evidence in federal trials. 10

4. Id. at 167-68. "[S]afeguards built into other portions of the Federal
Rules, such as those dealing with relevance and prejudice, provide the court
with additional means of scrutinizing and, where appropriate, excluding
evaluative reports or portions of them." Id.

5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 304.
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. Id. at 589. "[T]he assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing. Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting
expert scientific testimony.
That austere standard, absent from, and
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials." Id.
10. Id. at 592-95. These factors are described more fully infra Part II.B.
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Under Daubert, many of the factors relevant to evaluating the
reliability of expert opinions under Rule 702 are notably different
than the considerations relevant to the "trustworthiness"
safeguard built into Rule 803(8)(C) for public records.1 1 While it
may have been sufficient when Beech was decided, for the reasons
described below, the trustworthiness safeguard embodied in Rule
803(8)(C) no longer serves as an adequate substitute for testing
the evidentiary reliability of expert opinions in public records for
purposes of Rule 702.12 Despite this deficiency, most federal
courts considering the admissibility of expert evidence contained
in public records have failed to faithfully perform the role of
gatekeeper described in Daubert.13 In doing so, these courts have
allowed into evidence expert opinions from public records that
otherwise could never have passed muster if they had been
authored by a privately-retained expert.
Part I of this Article explains the important role expert
opinions in public records can serve at trial, and why application
of the hearsay exception in Rule 803(8)(C) alone is not sufficient to
ensure the reliability of those opinions. It also explains why, in
determining the admissibility of expert opinions contained in
public records, courts should apply the same level of Daubert-type
scrutiny as expert testimony obtained from privately retained
sources. Part II of this Article discusses the diverse methods
cobbled together by courts and commentators to address the
inherent tension between the expert opinion rules and the hearsay
rules governing public records. This section also identifies the
practical and doctrinal shortcomings in each method. Part III
proposes a method for applying Daubert principles to expert
opinions in public records that recognizes and accounts for the
inherent differences between expert witnesses privately retained
for trial and public officials who express an expert opinion in a
government report.
I.

THE ROLE OF EXPERT OPINIONS IN PUBLIC RECORDS AND

THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

A. The Importance of Expert Opinions in Public Records
The "public records" exception to the hearsay rule contained

11. See infra Tbl.1 at pp. 936-37 (noting the different considerations
relevant to the untrustworthiness determination under FRE 803(8)(C) and the
reliability factors under Daubert).
12. See discussion infra Part I.C. (questioning whether Daubert should be
applied to public records).
13. See discussion infra Part II. (identifying confusion regarding the
reconciliation with the public records hearsay exception and the expert
testimony rules by noting the divergent approaches currently employed by the
federal courts).
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in Rule 803(8)(C) applies to
[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth ...[,] in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
14
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
This exception is invoked in a wide variety of civil cases.
Although the reports issued by some public agencies are
inadmissible by statute,15 government reports containing opinions
have played an important role in cases dealing with, among a
myriad of other topics, Federal Aviation Administration
"Airworthiness Directives" describing unsafe conditions in
aircraft; 16 gunshot residue experiments conducted by police
officers; 17 'Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports" conducted by
the Center for Disease Control and similar state agencies
investigating a link between toxic shock syndrome and tampon
use;18 Surgeon General reports on the dangers of smoking; 19 Coast
Guard reports related to a boating accident;20 and a fire
department report written following a propane gas explosion. 2' In
addition to documents prepared by federal agencies, the exception
extends to reports generated by public agencies on the state and
22
local levels.
Public record expert opinions admitted into evidence under
Rule 803(8)(C) and Beech can have a significant impact on the
outcome of trials. Juries tend to assign special weight to opinions
14. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).

15. See, e.g., Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1988)
(noting that, among others, Congress has determined reports prepared by the
National Transportation Safety Board and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall be inadmissible).
16. Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1315-16 (3d Cir.
1978).
17. Estate of Griffin v. Hickson, No. CIV.A. 98-3805, 2002 WL 988006, at *
1, 3 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2002).
18. Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg Co., 724 F.2d 613, 617-18 (8th Cir.
1983).
19. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 600-01 (8th
Cir. 2005).
20. In re Wandering Gentile, 143 F.R.D. 560, 562-64 (D. N.J. 1992).
21. Matthews v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 770 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 (5th Cir.
1985).
22. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note to Paragraph (8) (1972
Proposed Rules). "The rule makes no distinction between federal and
nonfederal offices and agencies." Id. See also 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.10[1] (Joseph
M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2d ed. 2009)(1975)(noting
that there is no distinction drawn between federal and nonfederal records, and
rather the sole criterion is whether the record is that of "public offices or
agencies").
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expressed by a governmental body.23 Public records carry an "aura
of special reliability and trustworthiness" because they are
prepared by a presumptively impartial governmental body. 24 This
presumed impartiality, coupled with the presumed expertise of
public agencies, give the opinions expressed in public records a
perceived measure of credibility and reliability that cannot be
matched by an opinion from a traditional expert for hire. The
"apparent 'official' nature [of public records] is likely to cause a
25
jury to give the evidence inordinate weight."
Despite the widespread use of public records and the
importance assigned by juries to expert opinions expressed in such
records, the means available to test the underlying basis for such
opinions are considerably less demanding than those for a
traditional expert. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any party wishing to use expert testimony from a privately
retained expert must disclose a significant amount of background
information, including the specific opinions of the expert as well as
the basis for those opinions, information considered by the expert,
the qualifications of the expert, and a statement of
compensation. 26 In addition, an expert witness retained by a party
is subject to cross examination at deposition and trial. 27 In
contrast, a public record often does not disclose the specific basis
for its opinions, the qualifications of its author, or the author's or
agency's motivation. 28
Third-party discovery from the public

23. See, e.g., James E. Robinson, Challenging Admissibility and Use of
Government Investigative Reports, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L. J. 887, 901
(2003) (stating undue prejudice "arises from the inordinate weight that a jury
is likely to give to the probable cause determination reached by a government
fact-finding body."); Note, The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative
Reports Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 96 HARv L. REV. 492, 495
(1982)[hereinafter The Government Evaluative Reports] (noting that "[b]ecause
the report has the government's endorsement, the jury might give it too much
weight.").
24. City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981). See
also Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d at 601 (observing
that "the fact that a report was prepared by a disinterested governmental
agency pursuant to a legal obligation constitutes a badge of trustworthiness");
The Government Evaluative Reports, supra note 23, at 507 (noting that "[t]he
biases of 'hired guns' can be exposed to the trier of fact during crossexamination when opposing counsel inquires about the fees the expert will
receive for his favorable testimony. Biased government reports, however, may
not be so easily impeached.").
25. Fowler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 92 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (discussing required expert disclosures).
27. See FED. R. EVID. 705 (stating "[t]he expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give reasons therefor[e] without first testifying to the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may
in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on crossexamination.").
28. The Government Evaluative Reports, supranote 23, at 493-95.

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:925

agency or official who authored the report often is very limited. 29
Furthermore, in many contexts, a public record may be admitted
into evidence without its author ever being required to testify. 30
The absence of any meaningful ability to test the reliability of
public record opinions might not be a major source of concern if
there was some assurance that government officials consistently
and rigorously employed reliable methodologies in arriving at the
conclusions expressed in those records. Unfortunately, there can
be no such blanket assurance.
The reliability of opinions
expressed in public records have been repeatedly questioned on
the basis of a wide variety of concerns, including the lack of public
officials' skill and experience, biases of the official or the agency
writing the report, faulty assumptions and methodologies, the
quantity and quality of resources devoted to the investigation, and
the investigator's reliance on material not admissible at trial.31

29. See Jason C. Grech, Note, Exxon Shipping, The Power to Subpoena
Federal Agency Employees, and the Housekeeping Statute: Cleaning Up the
Housekeeping Privilege for the Chimney-Sweeper's Benefit, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1137, 1145-47 (1996) (noting the limitations caused by agency
regulations).
As authorized by the Housekeeping Statute, most federal agencies have
passed regulations limiting access to agency records and testimony from
agency employees concerning agency business.... Often, housekeeping
regulations provide no standard of determination at all, giving the
agency head free rein. This lack of direct, unambiguous language allows
agency heads great leeway in their decisions whether to allow a
subordinate agency employee to testify.
Such power is dangerous
because it gives agency heads unfettered discretion to affect the outcome
of private civil actions. Under current procedure, once an agency head
makes a determination not to allow a litigant to obtain the testimony of
an employee, the litigant often is without any viable recourse.
Id.; see also David P. Graham & Jacqueline M. Moen, Discovery of Regulatory
Information for Use in Private Products Liability Litigation: Getting Past the
Road Blocks, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 653, 655-68 (2000) (discussing access
to regulatory information); William Bradley Russell, Jr., Note, A Convenient
Blanket of Secrecy: The Oft-Cited But Nonexistent Housekeeping Privilege, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 745, 749-62 (discussing the history and difficulties
in obtaining discovery from federal agencies).
30. See FED. R. EVID. 902 (discussing the self-authentication of public
records).
31. See Jack London, Issues of Trustworthiness and Reliability of Evidence
from NTSB Investigations in Third Party Liability Proceedings,68 J. AIR L. &
CoMM. 39, 50-55 (2003)(noting the evidentiary problems of trustworthiness
and reliability); Robinson, supra note 23, at 890-903 (discussing the grounds
for challenging the admissibility of a government investigative report); Alan
Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert" A Proposal to
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert
Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8-18
(2003)(discussing the shortcomings of agency regulation and accountability in
the science realm); D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and Judicial Review: How Does
an Administrative Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk Science?, 33
AKRON L. REV. 365, 367-70 (2000) (pointing out problems affecting regulatory
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The Supreme Court recently noted that, even in criminal cases,
documents that appear to utilize "neutral scientific testing" for law
enforcement purposes are often subject to a variety of institutional
pressures that can render the test results neither neutral nor
32
scientific.
While some of these concerns, in theory, might be filtered out
by a diligent application of the "trustworthiness" safeguard of Rule
803(8)(C), the hearsay exception is no better suited to accomplish
this task than trial courts' past reliance on the Frye standard for
A more systematic approach, such as that
expert evidence.
Court in Daubert,is the most effective
Supreme
established by the
of expert opinions expressed
reliability
the
means of ensuring that
in public records is on a par with the reliability of other expert
opinions offered into evidence in federal trials.
B. Evidentiary Reliability of Expert
Testimony Under Daubert
The Supreme Court in Daubert held that Rule 702 imposed on
federal courts the obligation to "ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable." 33 In carrying out this obligation, the Court declared that
district courts should serve as "gatekeepers" because, "[u]nlike an
ordinary witness, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand
knowledge or observation." 34 Such testimony "can be both powerful
35
and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it."
Thus, in deciding whether to admit expert evidence of a scientific
nature, the judge-"gatekeeper" must make "a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."36 As
the Court explained, "[p]roposed [expert] testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation ( i.e., 'good grounds') based on

agencies' decision-making and risk assessment process); Andrew Trask,
Comment, Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary Approach to Reviewing
Agency Determinations of Risk, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 569, 570-74 (1997)
(discussing the problems of credibility, inconsistency, and inaccuracy

in EPA

policies).
32. Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-37 (2009) (noting that
"[florensic evidence is not immune from the risk of manipulation" because,
among other influences, "A forensic analyst responding to a request from a law
enforcement official may feel pressure-or have an incentive-to alter the
evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.").
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
34. Id. at 592 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 595.
36. Id. at 592-93.
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what is known. '37
Daubert departed from Frye by requiring that district courts
play a more active role in assessing the validity of the methodology
or reasoning underlying proffered expert scientific evidence. 38 The
Court eschewed a rigid, all-encompassing checklist for trial courts
to follow: "The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one." 39 Subject to that caveat, the Court suggested four

factors that were relevant to the reliability assessment in the
context of the scientific evidence proffered by the plaintiff:
1.Whether the theory or technique underlying the expert
evidence can be (and has been) tested;
2. Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer-review and publication;
3. The known or potential rate of error for the particular
scientific technique, and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation;
is generally accepted in
4. Whether the theory or technique
40
the relevant scientific community.
In Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,41 the Supreme Court
extended the principles of Daubert to expert evidence outside the
realm of scientific knowledge. 42 Although the rationale underlying
Daubert borrowed heavily from the scientific method, the Kumho
Tire Court observed that the language of Rule 702 "makes no
relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical'
or 'other specialized' knowledge," and that the "evidentiary
rationale that underlay the Court's basic Daubert 'gatekeeping'
43
determination" was not limited to scientific evidence.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trial court must
undertake the same kind of reliability assessment in nonscientific
cases involving expert evidence that Daubert required in the
44
scientific context.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Id. at 592-93.
39. Id. at 594.
40. Id. at 593-94.
41. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
42. Id. at 147.
43. Id. at 147-48.
44. Id. at 148-49. Since Kumho Tire, federal courts have articulated a
number of additional factors that may bear on the reliability of nonscientific
expert evidence in particular cases including, for example, the relationship of
the technique to methods which have been established as reliable, the
qualifications of the expert in connection with the methodology employed, and
the uses to which the method has been put outside of the courtroom. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 235 (3rd Cir. 2004) (identifying
additional reliability factors discussed above). See generally FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee's note (2000 Amendments) (discussing the Daubert
relevance factors and noting that these factors are neither dispositive nor
exhaustive).
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C. Should Daubert Be Applied to Public Records?
Kumho Tire teaches that, regardless of the field of expertise
involved, Rule 702 requires a systematic analysis of the
methodological reliability of proffered expert testimony. Nothing
in Kumho Tire or Daubert suggests any exception to this
requirement. To the contrary, taking a cue from Kumho Tire, the
"evidentiary rationale" underlying Rule 702 and the systematic
analysis required by the Rule should extend to all expert evidence,
regardless of its source. There is no logical reason to relax the
court's gate-keeping role under Daubert simply because a
government official proffered an expert opinion in a public record.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance about the proper evidentiary standard to apply to expert
opinions contained in public records. In Beech, the seminal public
record case, the Supreme Court remained silent about how courts
should assess the reliability of expert opinions in public records
under Rule 702, even though the report at issue clearly contained
conclusions based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. 45 The issue in Beech was whether the opinion
expressed in a public record was within the scope of the hearsay
exception embodied in Rule 803(8)(C), not whether the opinion
satisfied the standards for expert testimony under Rule 702.46
Beech described the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 803(8)(C)
as a "safeguard" against the otherwise unreliable nature of a
hearsay opinion in a public record, but it did not address whether
that safeguard supplanted the reliability standards otherwise
47
applicable to expert opinions under Rule 702.
Some might argue that any distinction between the public
record hearsay exception and the expert opinion rules is illusory
because opinion evidence that is sufficiently reliable to be
trustworthy also is likely to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted
as an expert opinion. While the simplicity of this argument is
appealing, it overlooks three important points. First, opinion
evidence in a public record qualifies as an exception to the hearsay
rule because it is granted a rebuttable presumption of
trustworthiness. 48 The courts have never explicitly extended such
45. See Beech III, 488 U.S. at 157-59 (describing the nature of the Judge
Advocate General Report at issue in the case).
46. Id. at 160-61.
47. Id. at 167-68 (stating "[t]his trustworthiness inquiry-and not an
arbitrary distinction between "fact" and "opinion"-was the Committee's
primary safeguard against the admission of unreliable evidence, and it is
important to note that it applies to all elements of the report.").
48. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 858 (9th Cir.
1999) (upholding the presumption of trustworthiness in public records);
Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that this rule is "premised on the assumption that public officials perform
their duties properly without motive or interest other than to submit accurate
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a presumption to expert testimony. The hearsay rules have
embraced the presumption that public records are trustworthy
because they are prepared by officials who are acting under
authority of law and are expected to be unbiased and to possess
the knowledge, experience and credibility to monitor and govern
the relevant subject matter or field of activity. Ironically, this
presumption appears to be based on a legacy belief that itself is
neither tested nor verified. 49 And, as noted above, anecdotal
evidence suggests that there are many instances in which this
50
faith is not justified.
While the particular qualifications, experience, and likely
sources of bias of privately-retained experts are readily
discoverable, the specific background and viewpoint of the
government investigator who prepared a public record may not be
easily uncovered. Coupled with the practical limitations often
imposed on eliciting third-party discovery from many government
agencies, the presumption of trustworthiness effectively cuts off
the opponent's opportunity in any individual case to test whether
the author of the expert opinion in a public record is, in fact,
neutral or possesses the knowledge, experience, and credibility to
monitor or govern the field in a proper manner.
Second, trustworthiness for purposes of the public records
exception to the hearsay rule and reliability for purposes of the
expert opinion rule are two different things. That a public record
is sufficiently trustworthy to escape the bar of the hearsay rule

and fair reports")(quoting Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 805 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir. 1986)); Sussel v. Wynne, No. 05-00444, 2006 WL 2860664, at *2 (D.
Haw. Oct. 4, 2006) (stating "[a] trial court is entitled to presume that a public
report is authentic and trustworthy.") (citations omitted); Miranda-Ortiz v.
Deming, No. 94 Civ. 476, 1998 WL 765161, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1998)
(stating "[blecause it is assumed that public officials perform their duties
properly, investigative reports encompassed within Rule 803(8)(C) are
presumed to be trustworthy: the burden is thus placed upon the party
opposing the admissibility of the report to demonstrate its lack of
reliability.")(citation omitted).
49. Wigmore explains that official reports are accorded a presumption of
trustworthiness in part because they are prepared in the course of the
performance of an official duty:
Official honor may or may not be what it has been or what it ought to
be, and it may differ in different communities and persons. But in the
matters with which the law of evidence is concerned, official duty is on
the whole a vital force, more potent than might be supposed, even in a
community where official ceremony and dignity are as little regarded as
with us. And even if the traditionalassumption of the potency of official
duty and honor be in some regions or for some classes of incumbents
more a fiction than a fact, it is at least a fiction which we can hardly
afford in our law openly to repudiate.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1632 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis added).
50. Supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra note 63 and accompanying
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does not mean that the opinion expressed in the record is the
product of a valid and reliable methodology that has been tested or
is capable of being measured against some verifiable standard.
As a general rule, hearsay exceptions save second-hand
evidence from the scrap heap because something about the
circumstances of its creation bolsters its trustworthiness enough to
bring it up to the level of first-hand evidence that can be tested in
the crucible of cross-examination.5 1 Jurors are expected to be more
than capable of evaluating first-hand evidence from their own
experience. But simply being good enough to stand on a par with
first-hand evidence does not mean that a public record is reliable
enough to stand on a par with the heightened standards for expert
opinions. Unlike an excited utterance or present sense impression,
expert opinions require specialized knowledge that is likely to be
unfamiliar to the trier of fact and may depend in whole or in part
on something other than first-hand information.5 2 The reliability
of such opinions can frequently go off track for any number of
specialized or technical reasons that are unrelated to the factor
which bolstered its trustworthiness for hearsay purposes. Since
expert opinions can have a disproportionate influence on the trier
of fact, it is important that courts hold expert opinions in public
records to a higher standard of reliability than other evidence,
including evidence found to be sufficiently trustworthy to avoid the
53
bar of the hearsay rule.
Third, the specific factors used to test the presumption of
trustworthiness for public records in any given case are not the
same factors that are at the core of the courts' reliability gatekeeping responsibilities under Daubertand Rule 702. According to
the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(8)(C), the presumption
of trustworthiness can be rebutted by challenging the fairness,
completeness, and regularity of the investigation which
culminated in the public record. 54 While these procedural factors
51. As Wigmore explains in discussing the conceptual bases for exceptions
to the hearsay rule generally, "under certain circumstances the probability of
accuracy and trustworthiness of [a] statement is practically sufficient, if not
quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional manner." 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 (Chadbourne rev. 1974).
52. See FED. R. EVID. 701-03 (discussing limitations of opinion testimony by
lay witnesses, circumstances under which expert testimony is required, and
the bases of expert testimony).
53. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Judge Weinstein who noted that
"[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the

difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible
prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises
more control over experts than over lay witnesses.").
54. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note to Paragraph 8(C)
(1972 Proposed Rules) (noting that while the rule assumes admissibility in the
first instance, it allows ample provisions for escape if sufficient negative
factors are present).
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are obviously relevant to any reliability determination, Daubert
requires considerably more, including an assessment of the
substantive validity of the methodology upon which the proffered
expert opinion is based.5 5 A side-by-side comparison of the specific
factors relevant to this determination demonstrates the nature of
the difference:

Table 1
Considerations Relevant to
Untrustworthiness
Determination
Under FRE 803(8)(C)
Advisory Committee Note
(1972):
Factors which may be of
assistance in passing on the
admissibility of evaluative public
reports include:
(1) the timeliness of the
investigation;
(2) the special skill or experience
of the official;
(3) whether a hearing was held
and the level at which
conducted;
(4) possible motivation problems
suggested by Palmer v.
56
Hoffman.
"Others no doubt could be
57
added."
Courts have also listed other
factors to determine whether a
report is untrustworthy,
including such items as:
- finality of findings
- extent to which report is based

DaubertReliability Factors
Under FRE 702

Under Daubert,the trial
court must serve as the
gatekeeper to ensure that
expert testimony is both
relevant and reliable. In the
context of scientific evidence,
reliability should be
determined on the basis of
such factors as:
(a) whether the theory or
technique has been tested;
(b) subject to peer review or
publication, and existence of
standards;
(c) generally accepted within
the scientific community; and
(d) known or potential rate of
error. 59
In performing their gatekeeping role even in nonscientific cases, courts should
apply these or comparable
factors to test the reliability

55. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 ('This entails a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue.").
56. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). The Court held that an accident report was
inadmissible because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation, rather than
in the regular course of business.
57. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note to Paragraph 8(C) (1972
Proposed Rules).
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on inadmissible evidence or nonneutral sources
- possibility that the report
reflects agency's agenda or
mission
- the depth of the investigation
58
- the specificity of the report

of proffered expert opinion
testimony. Other factors
considered include:
- relationship of technique to
other techniques already
found to be reliable
- expert qualifications on
technique employed
- uses of technique outside of
60
litigation

The above-enumerated factors relevant to Rule 803(8)(C) and
Rule 702 do not purport to be applicable in every case, but there
can be no doubt that the analytical emphasis of each rule is
different. Rule 803(8)(C) is focused primarily on the procedure by
which the public agency collected and digested the facts, while
Daubert and its progeny under Rule 702 are focused on the
soundness and validity of the reasoning underlying the proffered
expert's opinion. 6 1 And while the opponent of a public record has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of trustworthiness

59. 509 U.S. at 593-94.
58. See, e.g., Colman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1342 n.4 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting seven additional factors to be considered when addressing the
adequacy of the investigative/evaluative process of agency determinations);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1147 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In re JapaneseElec.
Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (discussing the
seven additional factors).
60. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 Amendments). See
also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (1999) (stating that the goal of Daubert is to
ensure the expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting "[tirained experts
commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert"). "A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Id.; Sheehan v. Daily Racing
Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating Daubert "requires the
district judge to satisfy himself that the expert is being as careful as he would
be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.").
61. Jon Y. Ikegami, Note, Objection: Hearsay-Why Hearsay-Like Thinking
Is a Flawed Proxy for Scientific Validity in the Daubert 'Gatekeeper'Standard,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 706-07 (2000). "[A] crucial distinction must be made
between evidentiary reliability in the scientific sense, which focuses on the
validity of the underlying science, and evidentiary reliability in the hearsay
sense, which generally focuses instead on the circumstances surrounding the
evidence and the speaker." Id. at 707.
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under Rule 803(8)(C), the proponent of expert opinion testimony
has the burden of demonstrating that the witness' testimony is
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.62
It might be argued that scrutinizing a public record opinion
under Daubert is not really necessary because the hearsay
trustworthiness requirement, while concededly not the same as
Daubert, is a workable filter that has the effect of weeding out the
same kind of unreliable expert opinions that Daubert was designed
to detect. For example, consideration of potential biases or the
skills and experience of the public official or agency preparing the
report-both hearsay trustworthiness factors-could be expected
to filter out many unreliable opinions. But third-party discovery
from public officials or agencies is often limited or prohibited
altogether, so the party opposing the admission of public records
has only a limited opportunity, if any, to discover a problem and
develop an adequate record even with respect to these
trustworthiness factors.
Even if these indicia of lack of trustworthiness could be
readily uncovered, Daubert's reliability criteria are intended to
detect a much broader range of problems. As demonstrated by
cases challenging agency rulemaking, seemingly experienced and
disinterested public agencies are more than capable of reaching
63
conclusions that are unreliable or scientifically indefensible.
62. The proponent's burden at this stage under Daubert is to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert opinion is reliable, not to
prove that it is correct. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744, n.ll
(3d Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th
Cir. 1998) (stating "the party seeking to have the district court admit expert
testimony must demonstrate that the expert's findings and conclusions are
based on the scientific method, and, therefore, are reliable."); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
"the party presenting the expert must show that the expert's findings are
based on sound science, and this will require some objective, independent
validation of the expert's methodology.").
63. For example, in United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 441
(1st Cir. 1990), then Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer took the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to task for a two page calculation advocating a
standard for PCBs in soil based upon the assumption that small children
would eat contaminated dirt 245 days a year for three years. The court also
questioned the methods employed in the investigation of the contaminated
site, noting that the soil "samples" were not collected on a random basis, but
from already suspect "discolored soils." Id. at 441-42. Other courts have found
that federal agencies employed questionable scientific methodologies in a wide
variety of other contexts. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757,
763-66 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing rules for dolphin-safe nets for catching
tuna); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1183, 1192-94 (10th
Cir. 2006)(concerning logging in a National Forest); Midwater Trawlers CoOperative v. Dept. of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2002)
(involving the allocation of fishing rights to a Native-American tribe); Chlorine
Chem. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(regarding chloroform levels in drinking water); Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl.
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Expert opinions in public records are not immune from the malady
of "junk science" that infects many private opinions from highly
64
credentialed experts with no apparent stake in the outcome.
II.

CONFUSION AMONGST THE COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
ON HOW TO RECONCILE THE PUBLIC RECORDS HEARSAY
EXCEPTION AND THE EXPERT RULES

While the practical need and doctrinal bases for applying
Daubert to public record opinions are clear, the post-Daubert
caselaw involving public record opinions is not. The limited
number of cases that address this topic directly reflect a wide
variety of approaches, none of which are genuinely faithful to
Daubert. Some courts continue to believe that if an expert opinion
in a public record is sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy Rule
65
803(8)(C), it must be reliable enough to admit into evidence.
Other courts pay lip service to the need to apply Daubert
standards to opinions expressed in public records but then fail to
66
diligently perform the gate-keeping role required by Daubert.
Judges alone, however, are not solely responsible for the
confusion. If the relative dearth of caselaw discussing the tension
between Rule 803(8)(C) and the rules governing expert opinions is
any guide, it appears that litigants and their lawyers do not raise
this issue with any degree of frequency or pursue it with any
Prot. Agency, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing performance
standards for medical waste incinerators); Chem. Mfr. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 28 F.3d 1259, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (involving high risk
designations of certain airborne chemicals); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962,
975-80 (11th Cir. 1992) (concerning permissible exposure limits for 428 toxic
substances); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201,
1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing regulations for the manufacture,
importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos).
64. See, e.g., Harrison v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. Civ. 06-0745,
2008 WL 906585, at *9, 13 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2008) (finding that an expert,
who had an extensive curriculum vitae, including several chemistry-related
degrees, a Ph.D. from Stanford, a position as professor, and membership in
numerous professional associations, did "not carry sufficient indicia of
reliability to satisfy Rule 702 as explicated in Daubert and its progeny."); Toole
v. Toshin Co., No. 00-CV 821S, 2004 WL 2202580, at *2, 4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2004) (finding that the expert had "considerable academic and professional
experience" and "designed, manufactured and or tested a wide range of
mechanical and electrical devices and machines" but, nevertheless, "failed to
employ reliable methods and principles in reaching his conclusions and failed
to apply his methodology reliably to the facts of this case."); Coffey v. Dowley
Mfg., 187 F. Supp. 2d 958, 977 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (finding that despite the
expert's doctorate in mechanical engineering, sixteen years as a professor at
Tennessee Technological University, and nineteen years as a consultant, the
expert "did not apply scientifically valid principles and methodology to the
facts of this case.").
65. Infra text and accompanying notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
66. Infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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measure of thoroughness. And legal commentaries that have
addressed the subject exhibit a pattern of disarray that parallels
the confusion found in court decisions. Some commentators have
stopped at the point of recognition, choosing to note that tension
exists between Rule 803(b)(C) and Rule 702, but without offering a
definitive solution. 67 Others have argued that the trustworthiness
requirement of Rule 803(8)(C) is sufficient for public record expert
opinions. As explained below, however, all of these perspectives
fall short of a practical solution that is faithful to the principles
underlying both Rule 803(8)(C) and Daubert. The diverse
spectrum of legal thinking in this area makes manifest the need
for a single standard and procedure to govern the admissibility of
expert evidence contained in public records.
The first and most basic approach employed by some courts
when assessing the admissibility of an expert opinion in a public
record is to rely solely on a Rule 803(8)(C) trustworthiness
analysis. In Mayes v. City of Hammond,68 for example, after
finding that a police report satisfied the trustworthiness
requirement of Rule 803(8)(C), the district court refused to
consider the defendant's separate Rule 702 challenge to the report
69
or to critically analyze the methodology utilized in the report.
The court explained that it was not necessary to perform its gatekeeping role because "the bases for exclusion asserted by [the
defendant] in his reply brief was Rule 702 and Rule 26(a)(2), which
in fact go right back to the determination of trustworthiness of the
-70
underlying reports and are not a separate analysis ....
Mayes' holding is a convenient shortcut for determining the
admissibility of public records, but it disregards the substantive
differences between the hearsay trustworthiness analysis under
Rule 803(8)(C) and the expert reliability analysis under Rule 702
and Daubert. It presumes the reliability as well as the
trustworthiness of expert opinions in public records, thereby
67. For example, London, supra note 31, at 41, notes that public records are
presumptively admissible until proven untrustworthy, while expert opinion
testimony is presumptively inadmissible until proven reliable. Hence, London
observes, "[T]he admission of opinion testimony under Chapter VII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is dealt with in a manner exactly the opposite of
admission of written evidence which may contain the same opinions and
offered for admission under Rule 803(8)." Id. As London notes, however, the
resulting "conflict" between Rule 803(8)(C) and Daubert "is yet to be resolved."

Id.
68. No. 2:03-CV-379-PRC, 2006 WL 2054377 (N.D. Ind.July 21, 2006).
69. Id. at *7 n.2.
70. Id. See also Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d
532, 542 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting but not considering plaintiffs Rule 702
Daubert challenge to county tax assessment record because document was
admissible under Rule 803(8), "which holds such documents sufficiently
reliable because they represent the outcome of a governmental process and
were relied upon for non-judicial purposes.").
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placing the entire burden of demonstrating otherwise on the
opponent, 71 the party that in most cases tends to be the least able
to obtain full discovery in order to challenge the opinions stated in
the public record. Under this approach, the proponent of a public
record can avoid the burden Daubert assigned to the party seeking
to introduce the expert opinion into evidence. This result is
inherently inconsistent with Daubertand awards a presumption of
reliability to public records that is neither earned nor justified
from experience.
A second approach to the issue recognizes that, while Rule
702 involves consideration of a number of reliability factors that
are distinct from those trustworthiness factors typically associated
with Rule 803(8)(C), the two inquires are similar in nature and
should be melded into a single trustworthiness inquiry. 72 This
omnibus approach finds a source in the pre-Daubert sentiment
expressed by the district court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. 73 In assessing the admissibility of various
71. Mayes, 2006 WL 2054377, at *7. "The Court finds that the [police]
report appears trustworthy on its face. The burden thus shifts to Defendants
to demonstrate that the report lacks trustworthiness such that it should be
inadmissible." Id.
72. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co, 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1149 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. (noting that implicit
in the trustworthiness determination is the right to attack its helpfulness to
the trier of fact in order to understand the evidence presented under Federal
Rule 702). A variant of this approach is to deny the direct applicability of
Rules 702-705 but to allow the court to implicitly consider the factors relevant
to the expert rules in determining whether the evidence is unduly prejudicial
under Rule 403. Erik C. Olson, Note, Issues Concerning the Admissibility in
Federal Courts of Business Records Containing Opinions or Diagnoses Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 153, 171-72 (2008).
Taken from the business records exception to the hearsay rule, this approach
is based in part on the notion that the rules of expert evidence do not apply
directly because "Congress did not make Rule 803(6) explicitly subject to Rules
702-705." Id. at 166. Unfortunately, this commentary does not explain why
admissibility of an expert opinion under Rule 803(6) should be subject to Rule
403 if it is not also subject to Rules 702-705, or even why a Rule 403 safety net
is preferable to applying Rule 702-705 directly. Nor does it explain why the
burden of demonstrating that expert evidence is reliable under Daubert should
be shifted to the party opposing the record to show that it is prejudicial.
73. 505 F. Supp. at 1149. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The district court's lengthy opinion in
Zenith Radio addressed a significant number of substantive antitrust and
summary judgment issues as well as evidentiary issues, including Rule
803(8)(C)'s "trustworthy" requirement. Id. at 1125. On appeal, the Third
Circuit reviewed these various rulings, including the district court's Rule
803(8)(C) determinations. In re JapaneseElec., 723 F.2d at 267-73. While the
Third Circuit disagreed with some of the conclusions the district court reached
on the admissibility of particular documents under Rule 803(8)(C), it did not
reject the basic framework or new factors suggested by the district court for
evaluating "trustworthiness." Id. at 264-66. In the Supreme Court, Justice
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public records relating to plaintiffs' antitrust claims, the district
court in Zenith Radio folded the then-controlling Frye "general
acceptance" standard for scientific expert evidence 74 into its
expanded list of trustworthiness criteria under Rule 803(8)(C).75
The court's willingness to expand the trustworthiness analysis in
this way reflected its view that "most 803(8)(C) reports are in the
nature of expert reports" 76 and that there is a "close relationship
between 803(8)(C) and F.R.E. Article VII (the opinion evidence
rules)."77

Since Zenith Radio, the trustworthiness factors under Rule
803(8)(C) and the reliability factors under Rule 702 have diverged
as a result of Daubert and its progeny. 78 But efforts to merge the
analysis persist. One commentator argues that "when testing the
trustworthiness of opinion testimony under Rule 803(8)(C), it is
appropriate for one to utilize the framework provided by the
Federal Rules of Evidence for challenging the admission of expert
opinion testimony generally set forth in Rules 702 through 705."79
Similarly, in his Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, Professor
Saltzburg writes approvingly that limitations on the admissibility
of opinions in public records "are imposed by the Courts pursuant
to the trustworthiness clause of Rule 803(8)" in part because "the
standard of trustworthiness in Rule 803(8) is parallel to those
contained in Federal Rules 702-704."80
This willingness to include consideration of Daubert-like
reliability factors, albeit under the rubric of the Rule 803(8)(C)
trustworthiness inquiry, reflects the general sentiment that "[t]he
proponent [of a public record containing an expert opinion] should
not be better off by introducing the report instead of live testimony
from an expert."8' This sentiment is laudable, but merging the
reliability analysis into the trustworthiness analysis under Rule

Powell's majority opinion focused on the standard of review used by the Third
Circuit in evaluating the district court's summary judgment determination
and on issues related to substantive antitrust law. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
574. The Supreme Court did not address the district court's Rule 803(8)(C)

rulings. Id.
74. Frye, 54 App. D.C. at 47.
75. See Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1147 (listing as the seventh factor "the

extent to which the facts or data upon which the opinion is based are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.").

76. Id. at 1148.
77. Id. at 1149.
78. Robinson, supra note 23, at 894.

79. Id. at 894-95.
80.

STEPHEN A.

SALTZBURG

ET AL.,

4 FEDERAL

RULES OF EVIDENCE

MANUAL § 803.02[9][f] (9th ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2006) (1975).
Professor Saltzburg also cites his discussion of Daubert to support the
proposition that "untrustworthy opinions will be excluded" from business
records under Rule 803(6). Id. § 803.02 [7][h].
81. Id. § 803.02[9][f].
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803(8)(C) defeats the purpose.
Rather, merging the analysis
relieves the proponent of the public record expert opinion from the
burden of producing evidence to support the reliability of that
opinion. The burden shifts instead to the party who is seeking to
exclude the record to produce evidence that the methodology
employed by the government agency is not reliable. This result
not only places the proponent in a considerably better position
than if the opinion was delivered by a live witness, but it also
places the burden on the party least likely to be in a position to
know about the methodology behind an expert opinion in the
public record or to discover the facts necessary to make a specific
showing of unreliability.8 2 Placing this burden on the party least
likely to meet it opens the door to the introduction of expert
opinions in public records that could never have passed the gatekeeping scrutiny of Daubert.
One commentator has argued explicitly that, while the policy
considerations on each side of the issue make it a close question,
the "burden of proof' on the issue of reliability as well as
trustworthiness should be placed entirely on the party opposing
admission of a public record expert opinion.8 3 This position
accepts
the rationale
underlying
the
presumption
of
trustworthiness and extends it to support the reliability of expert
opinions in public records as well. This view is also predicated on
the notion that considerations of cost and judicial efficiency merit
the reversal of the normal allocation of the burden under Daubert
in this context.8 4 As already discussed, however, the rationale for
the presumption of trustworthiness-even assuming it is valid in
its own right-does not logically apply to many of the reliability
factors underlying a Daubert inquiry.8 5 Moreover, any efficiencies
resulting from the reallocation of the reliability burden to the
opponent would come at the expense of full and fair discovery, as
well as the development of evidence and demonstration of the
reliability concerns that motivated the Supreme Court's ruling in

82. See, e.g., Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1188 (holding that the defendants'
objection that a report prepared by the Statistical Office of the United Nations
did not indicate a confirmed source was "insufficient to impugn the sources of
the information and thus the presumed trustworthiness of the document.").
83. Harvey Brown, Daubert Objections to Public Records: Who Bears the
Burden of Proof? 39 HOUS. L. REV. 413, 433-35 (2002). This commentator's
reference to "burden of proof' is something of a misnomer. The burden
Daubert assigned to the proponent of expert testimony is the burden of
producing sufficient evidence to permit the trial court to make a preliminary
determination that the expert opinion is reliable, not to prove the validity of
the expert opinion. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780,
783 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
84. Brown, supra note 83, at 432-36.
85. Supra Tbl.1 at pp. 936-37.
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Daubert.8 6
A third approach to reconciling Rule 803(8)(C) and Rule 702
acknowledges the legal basis for a separate hearsay and expert
inquiry but, nonetheless, requires the opponent of the public
record evidence to show some indicia of untrustworthiness before
entertaining any Rule 702 challenge. The leading early case
embracing this approach was decided by the Third Circuit in 1978
in Melville v. American Home Assurance Co.8 7 In the course of
discussing the admissibility of Airworthiness Directives issued by
the Federal Aviation Administration, the Melville court found that
the inherent tension between Rule 803(8)(C) and Rules 702 and
705 could be "reconcile[d]" as follows:
Official reports are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
because they are presumed to be generally reliable. The objections
permitted by Rules 702 and 705 provide a means of testing their
reliability. Before these objections may be recognized, however, the
party challenging the validity of an official report under 803(8)(C)
must come forward with some evidence which would impugn its
88
trustworthiness.
The Melville court justified this two-step process on the
theory that allowing an objection to expert evidence in official
reports under Rules 702 and 705 without a prior threshold

86. In particular, the advocate of this burden-shifting approach argues that
requiring the opponent to demonstrate the unreliability of an expert opinion in
this context will change the result in only a few cases because (1) the opponent
already is obligated to identify "in a meaningful fashion" the reliability defect
in its Daubert objection before most courts will put the proponent to its proof
to demonstrate reliability; and (2) once the reliability issue is raised, the court
will hear the dispute anyway and the result is likely to change only where "the
judge is in equipoise or the parties elect not to conduct discovery." Id. at 43335. These arguments, however, overlook the practical realities typically facing
the parties in this context. In current practice, the opponent can raise a
Daubert challenge and put the proponent to its proof without having to come
forward with evidence of unreliability if it can identify a facial deficiency in
the expert's report or a substantive reason to doubt the expert's methodology.
Id. at 433. Requiring the opponent to affirmatively make an evidentiary
showing of unreliability-particularly in a setting where the government
report itself may not contain enough information or explanation to make a
facial attack, and discovery from government officials is severely
circumscribed-would, in many cases, effectively predetermine the result in
favor of admissibility. Requiring the proponent to justify the methodology of
the expert opinion it seeks to offer into evidence effectively levels the playing
field and removes the inherent bias resulting from expanding the presumption
of admissibility of public record expert opinions. See id. at 435 (disagreeing
with the notion but noting that "[t]his is not to say there are not good policy
arguments for imposing a Daubert obligation that the proponent of evidence
must show its reliability as part of the foundation for admissibility of opinions
in public records.").
87. 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 1316.
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showing of untrustworthiness "would have the practical effect of
nullifying the exception to the hearsay rule provided by Rule
803(8)(C)."8 9 This reasoning is dubious, even in the pre-Daubert
world. If a Rule 702 challenge truly provides a distinctive means
of testing the reliability of an expert opinion in an official report,
there is no good reason to withhold such a reliability test simply
because the report is otherwise presumed to be trustworthy under
Rule 803(8)(C). Acceptance of Melville's two-step approach could
lead to the admission of a "trustworthy" public record expert
opinion under Rule 803(8)(C) that nonetheless rests on a
fundamentally invalid premise or methodology. Moreover, as a
matter of logic, if the party opposing admission could make a
threshold showing that the public record lacks the necessary
indicia of trustworthiness, there would be no need to perform a
Rule 702 analysis because the record would be excluded as
inadmissible hearsay. Requiring the opponent of a public record
expert opinion to show untrustworthiness as a prerequisite for
making a Rule 702 objection would render Rule 702 meaningless
in this context.
Notwithstanding the flaw in Melville's logic, echoes of this
two-step process have been heard in later cases. For example,
citing Melville, the Eleventh Circuit's 1987 en banc opinion in
Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp. observed:
[A]lthough public records are excepted from the hearsay evidence
rule because they are presumed generally to be reliable, the
reliability of a particular evaluative report can be tested not only
with the trustworthiness inquiry called for by Rule 803(8)(C), but
also with the objections permitted by Rules 702 and 705. 90
Despite this professed willingness to test the reliability of
public records under the rules applicable to expert witnesses, the
Court did not consider any such objections because the party
opposing introduction of the report never challenged the
trustworthiness of the record under Rule 803(8)(C). 91
89. Id.
90. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir. 1987)(en
banc), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 488 U.S. 153 (1988)[hereinafter Beech 1].
91. Id. at 1508. "[Plaintiffs] attacked neither the qualifications of [the
report's author] nor the methodology he employed ....For these reasons, this
court cannot, and does not, set aside the district court's finding that the report
is trustworthy." Id. At the trial court level, the admissibility of the opinions
in the report in question was only decided the day before trial. Rainey v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523, 1527 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curium),
vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 791 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1986), and reinstated
en banc, 827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 903 (1988),
affirmed in part, rev'd in part, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) [hereinafter Beech 1].
"Surprised" that both opinions and facts would be admitted, the party
opposing the admission of the report was unprepared to challenge the
trustworthiness of those opinions; and, without evidence to the contrary, the
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The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Beech reflects the
same mindset. The public record at issue was a Judge Advocate
General report (the "JAG Report" or "Report") about an aircraft
crash, including the author's opinion on the cause of the crash. 92
The JAG Report's stated opinion assigning pilot error as the cause
of the crash indisputably involved scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge that should have triggered at least some
analysis under Rule 702.93 But apart from mentioning Rule 702 as
an example of the Federal Rules' openness to opinion testimony, 94
the Supreme Court's opinion in Beech makes no attempt to apply
the then-existing standards of Rule 702 to the JAG Report. To the
contrary, some of the Court's language suggests that admissibility
of the JAG opinion depended solely on satisfying the requirements
of Rule 803(8)(C):
As long as the conclusion [in the JAG Report] is based on a factual
investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement,
it should be admissible along with other portions of the report. As
the trial judge in this action determined that certain of the JAG
Report's conclusions were trustworthy, he rightly allowed them to be
95
admitted into evidence.
This broad language in Beech is not entirely consistent with
other portions of the same opinion. Indeed, Justice Brennan's
majority opinion also explains that Rule 803(8)(C) is not the
exclusive test of admissibility for a public record opinion.
According to Justice Brennan, "otherportions of the Federal Rules,
such as those dealing with relevance and prejudice," provide
additional "safeguards" against unreliable opinions contained in
public records. 96 The other rules, Justice Brennan explained,
"provide the court with additional means of scrutinizing and,
court found that the report was trustworthy. Id. at 1527. As the case made its
way through the appeals process the trustworthiness of the report was
generally taken as a given, and the courts focused instead on the issue of
whether 803(8)(C) permitted opinions to be admitted at all, rather than on
how to test the trustworthiness of those opinions. Beech III, 488 U.S. at 154,
156.
92. Beech III, 488 U.S. at 157-59.
93. See Id. at 169 (conceding that the "factual finding" in the JAG Report
"could also be characterized as an opinion, which the investigator presumably
arrived at on the basis of clues contained in the airplane wreckage.").
94. See Id. (stating "[a] broad approach to admissibility under Rule
803(8)(C), as we have outlined it, is also consistent with the Federal Rules'
general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.
Rules 702-705 permit experts to testify in the form of an opinion, and without
any exclusion of opinions on 'ultimate issues."'). The court further noted that
"Rule 701 permits even a lay witness to testify in the form of opinions or
inferences drawn from her observations when testimony in that form will be
helpful to the trier of fact." Id.
95. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added).
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where appropriate, excluding evaluative reports or portions of
97
them."
While the Court's opinion in Beech expressly referenced
relevance (Rule 402) and prejudice (Rule 403) and did not mention
Rule 702 in this context, the open-ended language of Justice
Brennan on this point makes clear that the admissibility of public
records are subject to scrutiny under all relevant Federal Rules of
Evidence, not simply Rule 803. This view is consistent with the
somewhat tortured language of the introduction to the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 803: "The [hearsay] exceptions [in Rule
803] are phrased in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay rule,
rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to repel any
implication that other possible grounds for exclusion are
98
eliminated from consideration."
The Supreme Court's failure to address Rule 702 despite its
reference to other Federal Rules of Evidence in this context most
likely reflects that, apart from challenging the author's
qualifications, the party opposing introduction of the JAG Report
in Beech did not dispute its trustworthiness under the hearsay
rules 99 and, thus, did not even put at issue its reliability under the
then-existing expert opinion rules. By its silence, however, the
Supreme Court's opinion fails to establish a framework for holding
the proponent of the JAG Report to its burden of demonstrating on
a preliminary basis that the expert opinion was reliable under
Rule 702.100
97. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
98. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules).
99. See Beech II, 827 F.2d at 1508 (stating that the plaintiff offered no
evidence contradicting the reliability of the report).
100. See Beech III, 488 U.S. at 169-70 (holding that "[a]s long as the
conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's
trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other
portions of the report."). The JAG Report was a written document and did not
constitute live testimony from a "witness," the form of evidence expressly
referenced in Rule 702. Id. at 157; FED. R. EVID. 702. Some commentators
have attempted to latch onto this distinction to suggest that Rule 702 may not
be applicable to public records or business records even if they contain expert
opinions. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 83, at 433 (stating "Rule 702 concerns
'testimony by experts' and does not purport on its face to reach expert opinions
in documents."); Olson, supra note 72, at 166 (stating "[a]s a business record
cannot be testimonial, Rules 702 and 705 [do not apply]"). But this view
ignores the substantive purpose of the rule. As the 1972 Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 803 acknowledge, a hearsay declarant is a witness, albeit an
out-of-court witness. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (1972
Proposed Rules). Conveying to the trier of fact the substance of that witness'
declaration for consideration on its merits is every bit as much testimony as if
the witness was on the stand, except that such a witness is not under oath and
is not subjected to direct examination and the crucible of cross-examination. If
anything, the absence of such safeguards should counsel for heightened, not
relaxed, standards of admissibility. It would elevate form over substance to
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If the two-step approach described by Melville and embraced
sub silentio by Beech ever could have been justified, it no longer
can after Daubert. As already discussed, under Daubert, the
factors central to the proponent's burden of demonstrating
sufficient reliability under Rule 702 are distinctly different from
the factors central to the opponent's burden of demonstrating lack
of trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(C)1O1; hence; there is no
analytical basis for making a Daubert challenge dependent on a
showing of lack of trustworthiness. Still, some courts continue to
make Rule 803 the ticket for consideration of challenges grounded
under Rule 702 and Daubert. For example, in a 2002 business
record case, Shelton v.Consumer Products Safety Commission, the
Eighth Circuit declared that, because the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the lab report in dispute
satisfied the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 803(6), the court
need not reach consideration of the appellant's Rule 702 challenge
02
to the report.'
A fourth category of court decisions that address the
admissibility of expert opinions in public records acknowledge the
need for the trial court to perform its normal gate-keeping role
under Daubert when examining public records, but no such
decision actually reflects a rigorous examination of the
methodology underlying the expert opinion at issue. In Desrosiers
v. Flight International Inc.,103 for example, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's exclusion of certain portions of a Judge
Advocate General's Report on the cause of an aircraft crash
because the opponent of the Report presented sufficient evidence
that the investigator was not qualified to render an opinion on the
cause of the crash.1 04 The Court found that the district court acted
in a manner "consistent with its role under Daubert and Rule 702
as a 'gatekeeper' for relevant and reliable evidence" when it
excluded the report from evidence. 0 5 Citing the trustworthiness
requirement of Rule 803(8)(C), the Ninth Circuit concluded that
"the district court's 'gatekeeper' role is not abrogated simply

allow for a witness to convey the substance of an expert opinion in a public
record without satisfying the reliability requirements of Rule 702 simply
because the opinion is communicated in written form rather than oral form.
101. Supra Thl.1 at pp. 936-37.
102. Shelton v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 277 F.3d 998, 1009 n.8 (8th
Cir. 2002). The business records hearsay exception of Rule 803(6), similar to
the public record of Rule 803(8)(C), provides that documents that otherwise
qualify as business records will not be excluded as hearsay "unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
103. 156 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 962-63.
105. Id. at 962.
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because the evidence falls under Rule 803(8)(C)."106
While the result in Desrosiers was right, the Ninth Circuit's
gloss over the basis for the district court's ruling was not. The
district court barred the disputed causation analysis in the JAG
Report from evidence because the opponent showed it lacked the
trustworthiness required by Rule 803(8)(C), not because the
proponent had failed to meet its burden under Daubert and Rule
702.107 The qualifications of an expert are obviously relevant to
any Rule 702 analysis, but the district court in Desrosiers never
reached the Rule 702 issue because the proponent of the report
never even attempted to qualify the author and investigator of the
JAG Report as an expert and the court never put the proponent of
the JAG Report to the burden of satisfying the requirements of
Daubert.0
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's gloss to the
contrary, the district court never performed its 'gatekeeper' role"
under Daubert.
The district court in Heary Bros. Lightning Protection Co. v.
Lightning Protection Institute ° 9 followed an approach similar to
Desrosiers in refusing to admit into evidence portions of a
Technical Manual issued by the United States Army relating to
electrical power supply systems. 110
Citing Desrosiers and
referencing Daubert's gate-keeping requirement, the district court
rejected the Technical Manual under Rule 803(8)(C), noting that
there are no affirmative guarantees with the Technical Manual that
the author has the expertise to evaluate the lightning tests, nor that
the author undertook a comprehensive or reliable investigation of
the scientific validity of lightning protection systems ....

There is

no evidence that the author had the scientific or technical expertise
106. Id.
107. See id. (concluding that the district court could have reasonably
inferred that the proffered opinion evidence lacked the required
trustworthyness for admission under Rule 803(8)(C)). Without going further,
the court noted that "the district court's actions were consistent with its role
under Daubert and Rule 702 as a 'gatekeeper' for relevant and reliable
evidence." Id.
108. Id. The district court stopped short of a full Daubert analysis and did
not even examine the scientific methodology of the report in question, hanging
its hat instead on the lack of qualifications of the report's author. Id. Indeed,
this issue does not appear to have been fully briefed before the Ninth Circuit
as the appellants simply argued the report was trustworthy under 803(8)(C).
Reply Brief of Appellants at *21, Desrosiers v. Flight Int'l of Fla. Inc., 156 F.3d
952 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 97-16062). The appellee essentially argued the report
was cumulative and a waste of time, although it did also contend that the
author was not sufficiently qualified to be an expert. Answering Brief of
Appellees at *45-49, Desrosiers v. Flight Int'l of Fla. Inc., 156 F.3d 952 (No.
97-16062).
109. Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Protection Inst., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 262
Fed. Appx. 815 (9th Cir. 2008).
110. Id. at 1075-77.
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to support his or her conclusions, and the Plaintiffs may not
circumvent that requirement of offering scientific or technical
evidence merely because the Technical Manual is issued by the
government. 111
While Desrosiers and Heary Bros. clearly acknowledge the
need to conduct a separate Rule 803(8)(C) and Rule 702 analysis of
expert opinions in public records, neither case actually performs a
systematic Daubert analysis of the reliability of the methodology
underlying the public record opinion. In each case, it was not
necessary for the court to reach such an analysis because the
public record opinion was deemed to be untrustworthy under Rule
803(8)(C) and therefore inadmissible as hearsay. 112 The courts'
attempt to characterize these rulings as the product of a genuine
Daubert analysis tends to confuse rather than illuminate the
underlying basis for their decisions.
The disarray among the various court decisions in this area
exposes the current lack of any doctrinal or procedural framework
for testing the reliability of expert opinions in public records.
Standing alone, however, the establishment of a consistent
framework to apply Daubert in such cases will not assure the
regular application of its principles to expert opinions in public
records.
Research on post-Daubert court decisions generally
reveals that, while courts are more likely to exclude expert
evidence after Daubert than before, the courts' stated reasons for
excluding such evidence typically revolve around conventional
considerations, such as relevance and expert qualifications, and do
not involve consideration of the particular reliability factors cited
in Daubert.113

111. Id. at 1076.
112. Desrosiers,156 F.3d at 961-62; Heary Bros., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
113. See A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What
Empirical Studies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV.
109, 126-37 (2005) (containing a provocative summary of the empirical
research in this area). Vickers summarized results of a 2001 RAND Institute
for Civil Justice study of 399 federal court cases from 1980 to 1999, two
Federal Judicial Center surveys of judges in 1991 and 1998 along with one
survey of lawyers in 1999, a study in 2002 by Jennifer Groscup of appellate
decisions in federal and state criminal cases, and a study by Edward Cheng
and Albert Yoon of differences between states that have adopted Daubert and
states that adhere to the Frye standard. Id. at 126-36. Although these studies
produced somewhat variable results, at least two patterns emerged. Id. at 137.
As described by Vickers:
Taken together, these studies support two significant and somewhat
paradoxical conclusions: Daubert has indeed raised the bar to
admissibility, but judges are not frequently utilizing the reliability
factors suggested in the decision. In other words, while judges are
scrutinizing evidence more carefully, as required by Daubert, they
appear to be developing their own criteria for determining admissibility.
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This observed pattern in the cases likely reflects many
different influences. There is no doubt that Daubert has caused
experts and litigants alike to apply more rigorous scrutiny to their
114
methodology before the expert opinion ever reaches the courts.
Moreover, judges may be analyzing the issues of reliability with
the kind of flexibility encouraged by Daubert and without limiting
themselves to the specific reliability factors listed in the Court's
opinion. 115 But another contributing factor appears to be a certain
judicial ambivalence to the systematic examination of expert
11 6
methodology required by Daubert.
If judges are not presently scrutinizing with any rigor the
methodology underlying expert opinions in other contexts, it is fair
to question whether they will assume such an obligation when
asked to rule on the admissibility of expert opinions in public
records. The only answer lies in the faithfulness of judges to the
policies underlying Daubert and the persistence of litigants
insisting on its application.
A genuine examination of the
methodological basis for an expert opinion in a public record is
even more important than in cases involving privately retained
experts because the conclusions of government agencies often
carry even greater weight with juries than the conclusions of
private experts. 117 Moreover, third-party discovery from public
agencies is so circumscribed that often there is no other effective
way to gather the kind of information necessary to test the
reliability of those opinions. However lax some courts may be in
analyzing the reliability of private expert opinions, judges need to
be alerted to the heightened need for meaningful scrutiny of expert
opinions in public records.

III.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

This Article argues that proffered expert opinions in public
records should be subject to the same level of scrutiny for
reliability that Rule 702 and Daubert demand in other contexts.
The particular method by which that scrutiny should be applied is
complicated, however, by the basic difference between a live expert
witness able to respond to specific inquiries on the one hand and a
Id.
114. Christina L. Studebaker & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Judge and
Attorney Experiences, Practices,and Concerns RegardingExpert Testimony in
Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 328-29 (2002).

115. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Drainingof Daubert and the
Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
233, 241-42 (2006).
116. See Vickers, supra note 113, at 142-43 (noting two possible
explanations for the ambivalence: either the Daubert factors are inapplicable
to the evidence before the judge or the judge may not have a proper
understanding of how to apply the factors).
117. Robinson, supra note 23, at 901.
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static public record in written form on the other hand. Moreover,
there are practical differences between a traditional expert hired
by a party to give opinion testimony on a disputed issue and a
public official writing an official report based upon a factual
investigation previously conducted in the course of his or her
official duties.
Public officials have numerous governmental
duties that might suffer considerably if they are required to
respond to, prepare for, and participate in the kind of private
discovery and trial procedures to which we subject traditional
experts. 118
In many cases, public officials will not have the
opportunity or inclination to prepare adequately, if at all, for
discovery or trial, thereby undermining the value and usefulness
of the official's ability to explain or defend the opinions expressed
in the report. In addition, by the time discovery and trial take
place in any given case, many months, if not years, are likely to
have elapsed since the investigation was completed and the official
report written. Even if the author or investigator is still in a
position of authority, he or she may not be able to recall the details
of the factual investigation or the specific rationale underlying the
opinion expressed in the report.119
These considerations are often identified as among the actual
"justifications" for the public record hearsay exception. 120 Indeed,
the law of evidence is strewn with imperfect compromises to
accommodate real world needs and limitations.' 2' But making

118. See The Government Evaluative Reports, supra note 23, at 496 (noting
that part of the justification for Rule 803(8)(C) is that "in-court testimony
would unduly burden government officials."). A similar concern was voiced
recently by twenty-six states and the District of Columbia in an amici brief
filed in the Supreme Court urging the Court to overturn or substantially
modify its ruling last term in Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)
that the Confrontation Clause required the prosecution to make available live
testimony from lab technicians in support of lab reports used in criminal drug
prosecutions. The amici argue that, in addition to necessitating the
expenditure of substantial additional time, effort and money, requiring live
testimony from analysts in support of forensic lab reports "diverts analysts
from their primary responsibilities of conducting scientific testing on drug
samples, increases the already substantial backlog of cases awaiting forensic
testing, [and] delays the scheduling of drug cases for trial." Brief of Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 24, Briscoe v. Virginia, (S.Ct.) (No. 0711191).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note to Paragraph (8) (1972
Proposed Rules) (stating that part of the justification for the public records
hearsay exception is "the unlikelihood that [the public official] will remember
details independently of the record.").
120. Id.
121. Wigmore explains, for example, that the hearsay rule exceptions are
grounded in two principles: (1) the principle of necessity and (2) the principle
of circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1421-22 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The necessity principle underlies the public
records exception to the hearsay rule because, according to Wigmore, "[w]ere
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such an accommodation and allowing such evidence to be admitted
without meaningful scrutiny betrays the importance of the
principles underlying Daubert. Expert opinions have the potential
to be game-changers, and expert opinions with the government's
imprimatur even more so than traditional expert testimony. If the
Supreme Court's concerns about the reliability of expert opinions
that motivated Daubert are genuine, courts should do more than
essentially ignore Daubert's gate-keeping safeguards when ruling
on the admissibility of expert opinions in public records.
How can Daubert be applied to an expert opinion contained in
a public record? The written record of a government investigation
is static. Standing alone, the document itself is unlikely to contain
the kind of information needed to actively evaluate such issues as
whether the methodology employed by the public agency has been
or can be tested, whether it has been peer reviewed, whether it has
an acceptable error rate, or whether it is generally accepted in the
field. Without a live and qualified witness to advocate the position
expressed in the public record, the document itself is not likely to
be sufficient on its face to be admissible as an expert opinion.
While it is true that the reliability of the expert opinion itself
should be tested according to Daubert's standards, the typical
absence of a live expert witness from the relevant government
agency makes application of Daubert difficult. The underlying
problem is that, in many civil cases, expert public officials do not
occupy the same relationship with the parties or the issues as
privately retained experts, so implementation of a Daubert-style
review will necessitate certain procedural accommodations. Even
when there is no statute or regulation prohibiting expert
testimony from public officials, few public agencies are likely to
willingly make the arrangements necessary to make one of their
own employees available to prepare and facilitate discovery and
testimony of this type. In all likelihood, a requirement that
parties seeking to introduce public record expert opinions into
evidence produce a qualified witness from the authoring agency
would result in few public record expert opinions being admitted.
This result is not as radical as it might seem. Before Beech,
some federal courts barred the introduction of opinion evidence in
public records altogether on the theory that Rule 803(8)(C) did not
except opinions from the hearsay rule. 122 This position was openly

there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering their depositions before an officer." Id. § 1631.
122. See, e.g., Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1980)

(discussing Rule 803(8)(C) and the differences between "factual findings" and

"opinions" and admitting "factual findings" while stating that "evaluative
conclusions and opinions of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation
contained in the report should not have been admitted into evidence.").
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advocated by the House Judiciary Committee during Congress'
consideration of proposed Rule 803.123
Even after Beech, a
significant number of statutes and regulations still prohibit the
introduction of certain public reports as well as testimony from
agency personnel about the subject matter of their official
124
investigations.
Rigid compliance with conventional Daubert procedures in the
context of public record expert opinions has the virtue of
consistency and reliability. But at the same time, such an
approach runs counter to Beech's stated goal of liberalizing the
125
admissibility of public record opinions in appropriate cases.
While the tension between Daubert and Beech is unmistakable,
the Supreme Court's guidance in these cases is not irreconcilable.
It is possible to fashion a course that allows for the admission of
public record expert opinions, subject to reliability scrutiny
consistent with Daubert, without overburdening public agencies
with litigation-oriented demands.
One plausible method to thread the needle would be to open
up the range of acceptable testimonial options to provide the
foundation for the opinion expressed in the public record. If the
official who authored the public record (or another qualified
representative of the public agency) is available, the proponent
could choose to produce such a witness for discovery and trial

123. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, H.R.REP. No. 93-650, at
14 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088.
124. For example, "[n]o part of a report of the [National Transportation
Safety] Board, related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be
admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a
matter mentioned in the report." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 2009). Some
states also have similar provisions for reports issued by their own
transportation agencies. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3754(b) (West
2009) (requiring that certain reports and records shall not be discoverable or
admissible and, furthermore, that officers or employees preparing such
documents shall not give depositions or evidence pertaining to such
documents). Along these lines, also excluded are:
reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data compiled or collected for the
purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement
of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railwayhighway crossings.., or for the purpose of developing any highway
safety construction improvement project which may be implemented
utilizing Federal-aid highway funds.
23 U.S.C.A. § 409 (West 2009). A similar rule bars the admission of U.S.
Coast Guard marine casualty reports. 46 U.S.C. § 6308(a) (West 2006).
Similarly, the rules governing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission state "[n]o
report by any licensee of any incident arising out of or in connection with a
licensed activity made pursuant to any requirement of the Commission shall
be admitted as evidence in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report." 42 U.S.C. § 2240 (West 2006).
125. See Beech III, 488 U.S. at 169 (recalling the intended broad approach to
admissibility under Rule 803 (8)(C)).
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testimony if the proponent believes that the official is willing and
able to devote the necessary resources to the project.
Alternatively, the proponent could choose to produce for discovery
and trial testimony a privately retained "supporting expert," an
expert-qualified witness knowledgeable about either the public
agency's actual methodology or the type of methodology employed
by the public agency in arriving at its opinion. In the supporting
expert's trial testimony, the witness would be responsible for
describing his or her own background and experience, outlining
the methodology utilized by the agency to the extent necessary to
understand the agency's opinion, and disclosing the public
agency's opinion. The witness would be expected to provide
foundational support for the methodology employed by the agency
and the agency's use of that methodology in the case at hand, but
it would not be necessary for the supporting expert to have
independently verified the agency's opinion or personally adopted
126
the opinion.
Preferably, the supporting expert will be able to draw upon
his or her familiarity with the agency's particular methodology in
the case at hand; but if not, it may be sufficient in many cases that
the supporting expert's knowledge is based upon his or her
familiarity
with the methodology used
in comparable
circumstances or with the standard operating procedure at the
agency. A typical example of such a supporting expert would be a
former agency investigator or analyst who is closely familiar with
the standards and methods of their former employer and has the
time or resources to fill in whatever gaps exist in the underlying
record.
The public record itself would function as the Rule 26(a)
expert report. The testifying expert (whether a public official or a
supporting expert) would be required to submit a supplement to
the original public record to explain and support the methodology
employed by the public agency and the use of that methodology in
the context of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.
Although no doubt preferable from the proponent's point of view,
the supplemental report need not adopt the agency's opinion itself
126. At a minimum, therefore, the supporting expert would serve the
conventional role of an expert who expresses an opinion that the agency's
methodology itself, and the use of the methodology under the circumstances
presented by the case, was valid. Since the supporting expert will not have
conducted or overseen the methodology being applied to the facts of the case at
hand, he or she will not normally be in a position to adopt or endorse the
agency's ultimate opinion itself.
Of course, if the supporting expert

independently applies that methodology (or an alternative methodology) to the
facts of the case and achieves results that are identical or similar to the
results found by the public agency, the supporting expert may also adopt or
endorse the agency's opinion if the expert's independent procedure otherwise
satisfies Rule 702 and Daubert.
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or show the results of an independent test of the agency's opinion.
It would suffice that the supplement contains sufficient
information (coupled with the supporting expert's deposition or
Daubert hearing testimony) to demonstrate that the agency's
methodology satisfies the kind of reliability factors cited in
Daubert and that the agency's use of such a methodology in the
case was a reliable means of arriving at the opinion expressed in
the public record. If the testifying expert cannot obtain the
information necessary to satisfy these elements and the court
concludes that it cannot sufficiently assess the reliability of the
agency's opinion without it, the public record opinion should not be
admitted under Rule 702.
In addition to a defense of the public agency's methodology
and its application to the case, the supplement should also provide
as much of the other information required by Rule 26(a) as is
readily available that is not already included in the public record.
The supporting expert can draw upon the government agency or
his or her own background and separate sources to supply the
missing information so long as the information satisfies Rule 26(a)
as well as Rule 702 and is otherwise logically supportive of the
conclusions stated in the public record. If either the public agency
witness or the supporting expert is able to provide sufficient
information to satisfy the court in the exercise of its gate-keeping
role under Daubert, the witness can testify at trial as any other
expert. And if the written public record itself has independent
significance, the proponent can introduce the expert portion of the
report for the truth of the opinion asserted if it otherwise satisfies
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Insisting on adherence to the basic principles underlying
Daubert will add new procedural and substantive hurdles onto the
party seeking to introduce a public record expert opinion into
evidence. The extra burden will be relatively limited in cases
where qualified government officials are available and willing to
participate in the process. In other cases, the additional hurdle of
locating and preparing a supporting expert may not seem worth
the effort because a supporting expert may not appear to the jury
as authoritative as a formal government report or qualified
government witness. After all, as envisioned by this proposal,
supporting experts will be privately retained (thereby losing the
benefit of the presumed neutrality of government officials) and will
not have been personally involved in the investigation or
evaluation that culminated in the report.
But this possible
dilution of the effectiveness of public record expert opinion
evidence will be counteracted, at least in part, by the supporting
expert's ability to bring into evidence the otherwise inadmissible
government's opinion and to explicate and justify the
methodological basis for that opinion. When willing and able, the
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supporting expert may also contribute his or her own endorsement
to the government's conclusions. In some cases, a supporting
expert's background and qualifications may even save the
admissibility of a particular expert opinion in a public record by
bolstering the court's otherwise shaky confidence in the reliability
of the government agency's conclusions.
A rule that allows the proponent to opt for a substitute
witness to serve as a supporting expert in order to meet Daubert's
requirements should relieve a meaningful part of the time and
expense the proponent and the government agency would
otherwise need to invest. Depending on the nature of the public
record and the original investigation, normally it should not be
necessary for the supporting expert to reinvent the wheel and
conduct an entirely new investigation, thereby saving the
proponent the potentially considerable expense of starting from
scratch. Meanwhile, the party against whom the public record
expert opinion is offered has the added protection of a meaningful
Daubert review before the opinion can be introduced into evidence.
Of course this approach will not always result in a perfect
resolution of the tension between Beech and Daubert. For
example, the supporting expert will not always be able to access or
produce sufficient information to adequately defend the
methodology underlying the public record expert opinion. If the
lack of access is curable, the court should be able to facilitate
access by court order. But if the needed information is not
accessible or otherwise reproducible, any expert opinion based on a
methodology that cannot be defended adequately should be
excluded. Given the importance of providing the trier of fact with
expert evidence that is reliable, excluding expert opinions in public
records that cannot be defended with the same level of scrutiny as
other expert opinions is preferable to admitting such evidence on
the strength of an unproven and hyperextended legal presumption
of trustworthiness.
Even if the supporting expert has access to sufficient backup
information, disputes may arise over which particular portions of a
public record that the proponent wishes to introduce into evidence
actually implicates scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, thereby triggering Rule 702 and a Daubert inquiry. In
order to minimize its Daubert burden, the proponent may attempt
to selectively designate only limited portions of the public record
as containing Rule 702 material while seeking to classify the
balance of the document as nonexpert in nature. The opponent,
hoping to maximize its adversary's burden, may contend that
additional portions of the report constitute Rule 702 material for
which the proponent is required to hire a testifying expert to
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satisfy Daubert.127 As a matter of good practice, the parties should
be required to identify their positions on this issue and any
disputes resolved in a front-loaded process that: (1) allows each
side to receive adequate notice of precisely which public record
opinions or other evaluative material its adversary seeks to
introduce into evidence; and (2) provides adequate time before
expert disclosures otherwise are due to resolve by stipulation or
court order any dispute over which portions of a public record
triggers Rule 702.
On balance, the extra burden associated with these
procedural steps pales in comparison to the benefit of requiring
that public record expert opinions meet the same standard of
reliability as other expert testimony. Daubert's insistence that
courts serve as gate-keepers for expert testimony at trial serves an
important goal of excluding from evidence specialized opinions
that have only the appearance of reliability. Expert opinions in
public records are no different and should be analyzed with the
same level of scrutiny.
As the Supreme Court has said, courts need to be vigilant in
their role as evidentiary gatekeepers, excluding "junk science"
while permitting opinions based on sound scientific principles. For
too long, however, the public records hearsay exception has acted
as a backdoor through the Daubert gate for faulty opinions found
in public records. Opinions in government reports should be
subject to a meaningful review of the methodology behind them,
just like every expert opinion since Daubert. Theoretical and real
world problems, however, have hindered the development of a
straightforward way of testing these opinions. The proposed
solution in this Article, however, offers a remedy mindful of both
these theoretical and practical problems, while seeking to balance
the interests of proponents and opponents in assuring that cases
are decided based on sound evidence.

127. It may not always be obvious on its face specifically what information in
a public record qualifies as Rule 702 material and what information does not.
For convenience, this article has typically referred to Rule 702 material as an
expert opinion; but in fact, the rule is written broadly to encompass any
testimony of a scientific, technical, or specialized nature that will assist the
trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed
Rules). In order to determine which information in the public record requires
the court to exercise its Daubert gate-keeping function, it will be necessary in
disputed cases for the parties and, if necessary, the court to delineate
specifically which information in the record qualifies as expert in nature and
which information does not.

